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Abstract—In this paper we assess the security performance of
key-less physical layer authentication schemes in the case of time-
varying fading channels, considering both partial and no channel
state information (CSI) on the receiver’s side. We first present a
generalization of a well-known protocol previously proposed for
flat fading channels and we study different statistical decision
methods and the corresponding optimal attack strategies in order
to improve the authentication performance in the considered
scenario. We then consider the application of machine learning
techniques in the same setting, exploiting different one-class
nearest neighbor (OCNN) classification algorithms. We observe
that, under the same probability of false alarm, one-class classifi-
cation (OCC) algorithms achieve the lowest probability of missed
detection when a low spatial correlation exists between the
main channel and the adversary one, while statistical methods
are advantageous when the spatial correlation between the two
channels is higher.
Index Terms—Authentication, machine learning, one-class
classification, physical layer security, time-varying fading, wire-
less networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The physical transmission layer has gained attention from a
security point of view in the last years, thanks to its ability to
guarantee secrecy without any need of pre-shared keys [1]. In
addition, contrary to classic cryptographic approaches based
on computational security, physical layer security metrics do
not require to make any assumption on the computing power
of attackers. This, jointly with the low algorithmic complexity
of physical layer security techniques, has made this area of
research of great relevance for some scenarios like that of
resource-constrained wireless devices [2]. In fact, the diffusion
of the Internet of Things (IoT) and a growing number of
devices deployed over networks have forced security and
authentication schemes to meet new requirements, such as
low latency and delay, limited storage and energy constraints.
Traditional cryptographic methods, however, are characterized
by a complexity that barely fits these requirements. Physical
layer techniques on the other hand help in reducing the burden
of heavy computations and guarantee a level of security which
does not depend on the attacker’s capabilities.
Authentication aims at recognizing messages coming from
a legitimate transmitter, while detecting those originated by
a malicious attacker. At the physical layer, authentication is
performed exploiting the unique characteristics of the commu-
nication channel to distinguish the source of the message [3].
In this paper, we assess the security performance achiev-
able by physical layer authentication (PLA) protocols over
wireless parallel channels affected by time-varying fading.
Effects of time-varying fading have been studied in literature
considering schemes based both on the sharing of a secret
key [4] and key-less approaches [5], [6]. In order to improve
the performance degradation due to channel time variability,
we propose different decision methods, starting from the
work done in [7] in a flat fading model. We first consider
statistical criteria which follow a hypothesis testing approach
[8], and their corresponding optimal attacks. We then exploit
machine learning resources, whose application to PLA has
started to attract interest in literature in the last years under
different scenarios [9], [10]. Only recently, authors in [11]
proposed the use of kernel machine-based methods to improve
the authentication performance in time-varying environments.
With respect to [11], we consider a more realistic training
phase corresponding only to the initial state of the channel and
the existence of some correlation between the main channel
and the adversary’s one. We also study one-class nearest
neighbor (OCNN) algorithms, and show that in the considered
setting they achieve good performance, especially when the
attacker’s channel has a low correlation with the main one.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the system
model is described. In Section III we present three different
decision methods that can be adopted by Bob and the cor-
responding optimal attack strategies. Section IV introduces
one-class classification techniques. Numerical results about
the security performance of the system are provided in Section
V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We analyze the channel model depicted in Fig. 1 where a
peer, Alice, has to be authenticated by an authenticator, Bob,
at the presence of a malicious attacker, Eve, who aims at
impersonating Alice by forging her messages. Through PLA,
Bob should be able to distinguish the messages coming from
Alice as legitimate and to refuse those coming from Eve.
A set of N parallel channels is considered, modeling
for example a multi-carrier or orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) transmission. The channel impulse re-
sponses (CIRs) of each channel are collected into a vector h
of complex numbers, whose entries are zero-mean correlated
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Fig. 1. Physical layer authentication channel model.
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian variables. The chan-
nel between Alice and Bob is denoted as an N -size vector
h(AB) ∼ CN (0N×1,R
(AB)). (1)
Transmissions are subject to slow or fast fading, which deeply
affects the quality of authentication, and to additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). Depending on how fast the channel
varies over time, for Bob it is more difficult to establish
whether any received packet comes from Alice or from Eve.
The authentication procedure we consider is based only
on channel estimates, and does not require additional cryp-
tographic mechanisms. In general, an authentication protocol
comprises two phases, that are summarized in the following.
Phase I: In the setup phase, Bob receives a known packet
that surely comes from Alice. This can be guaranteed either
by exploiting higher layer cryptographic schemes or through
physical measures (e.g., by manually executing the setup
phase). By exploiting the setup packet (with known content),
Bob obtains an estimate of the channel between himself and
Alice at time t0, which can be written as
hˆ(AB) = h(AB) +w(I), (2)
where w(I) ∼ CN (0N×1, σ2I IN ) is a noise vector.
Phase II: During normal operation, Bob receives further
packets from Alice and exploits them to estimate the channel
between him and Alice again. By comparing any of these
estimates with the reference one obtained during the setup
phase, Bob tries to understand whether each packet comes
from Alice or not. In order to evaluate security in the
worst case scenario, we suppose that in this phase Eve can
potentially modify the channel estimation obtained by Bob
into any vector g, as already done in [7].
Bob resorts to an hypothesis test [12] to decide whether the
transmission was performed by Alice or not. Denoting by hˆ
the channel estimated by Bob, the two hypotheses are
• H0: the message is coming from Alice. This hypothesis
can be verified on the basis of the correlation between
estimates made in different time instants, which depends
on the severity of fading affecting the channel. We
represent it as a real number between 0 and 1, where
1 corresponds to the case of a flat fading channel. We
work under the hypothesis of slowly time-varying fading
channels, meaning that the fading coefficient is assumed
constant during transmission of each packet [13]. The
hypothesis H0 at time t can therefore be written as
hˆ(t) = α(t)h(AB) +
√
1−α2(t)wF +w
(II)(t), (3)
where α = [α1, · · · , αn] represents the vector of time
correlations on each channel. wF represents a random
variable generated according to a Rayleigh statistics with
unitary variance. This is different from [14, eq. (59)],
where Jakes fading is considered.
• H1: the message is coming from Eve, and
hˆ(t) = g +w(II)(t). (4)
From Eve’s point of view, we suppose that she knows ex-
actly which decision strategy is applied by Bob, and performs
a tailored attack. Moreover, we suppose that the attacker has
a partial channel state information (CSI), so she knows the
statistics of the channels between Alice and Bob and between
Alice and herself, but not the exact channel realizations.
We assume that Eve can observe transmissions from Alice
to Bob and vice versa, thus estimating h(AE) and h(EB). We
denote the channel estimates performed by Eve at instant t0
as
hˆ(AE) = ρAEh
(AB) +
√
1− ρ2AEr+w
(AE), (5)
hˆ(EB) = ρEBh
(AB) +
√
1− ρ2EBr+w
(EB), (6)
where w(AE) ∼ CN (0N×1, σ2AE IN ) and w
(EB) ∼
CN (0N×1, σ2EBIN ) represent the noise vectors and r is a
random component with complex entries. ρAE and ρEB denote
the spatial correlation between the attacker channels (Alice-
Eve and Eve-Bob) and the main channel, respectively.
We suppose that Eve’s attack is based only on the estimates
overheard during Phase I, since Bob relies only on this for the
subsequent authentication phase. This is opposed to a differen-
tial authentication approach [14], in which Bob progressively
updates its reference estimate. The latter, however, is suitable
in the case of correlated fading over time, which is not the case
we consider. As a consequence, the time coefficient vector
α(t) does not affect her forged vector g.
III. STATISTICAL DECISION TECHNIQUES
In this section we discuss two different statistical criteria
for Bob to decide between the two hypothesesH0 andH1. We
evaluate the reliability of these tests by measuring the errors
that follow from them, i.e. the probability of false alarm (FA)
and the probability of missed detection (MD). By false alarm
we mean the event that occurs when Bob rejects a message
coming from Alice, while there is a missed detection when
he accepts a message forged by Eve. If we take a measure
to reduce the probability of a FA, normally this increases the
probability of a MD. Therefore, a trade-off between these two
effects has to be found.
It is important to observe that while time-varying fading
negatively affects the correct authentication of legitimate
signals, it plays a positive role from the attacker’s point of
view. As will be shown in the following, it directly influences
the probability of FA, forcing Bob to accept a larger range of
inputs, and thus increasing the chances for Eve that one of
her forged messages is accepted as authentic.
A. Logarithm of likelihood ratio test
Let us first examine the generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT) [12], as done in [7], where flat fading channels were
considered. We take into account the more general case in
which channel variations occur during the authentication.
The GLRT consists in comparing the logarithm of the
likelihood ratio (LLR) with a threshold θ > 0, i.e.{
Ψ ≤ θ : decide for H0,
Ψ > θ : decide for H1.
(7)
According to [7], the LLR can be written as
Ψ ∝ 2
N∑
n=1
1
σ2n
∣∣∣hˆn − hˆ(AB)n ∣∣∣2, (8)
where σ2n represents the per-dimension variance, evaluated as
σ2n = σ
2
I + σ
2
II + 1− α
2
n(t).
By substituting (3) in (8), we obtain that under the hypoth-
esis H0, Ψ is a non-central chi-square random variable as in
[7], with non centrality parameter
µ =
N∑
n=1
1
σ2n
∣∣∣(αn − 1)h(AB)∣∣∣2 . (9)
We note that µ is strictly dependent on α, and becomes zero
in the limit case of αn = 1 on each channel (absence of
fading), which boils down to the case shown in [7].
We can evaluate the probability of false alarm PFA , i.e. the
probability that Bob refuses a message coming from Alice, as
PFA = P [Ψ > θ|H0] = 1− Fχ2,µ(θ), (10)
where Fχ2,µ(·) denotes the cumulative density function
(c.d.f.) of a chi-square random variable with 2N degrees of
freedom and noncentrality parameter µ.
By substituting the hypothesis H1 in the LLR (8), we note
that Ψ is again a non-central chi-square random variable, but
the noncentrality parameter in this case is
β =
N∑
n=1
1
σ2n
∣∣∣g− h(AB)∣∣∣2 . (11)
We can calculate the probability of missed detection as
PMD = P [Ψ ≤ θ|H1] = Fχ2,β(θ). (12)
By imposing a target PFA , the threshold is set as
θ = F−1
χ2,µ
(1− PFA). (13)
For the first decision method we resort to the attack strategy
developed in [7]. The maximum probability of attack success
is achieved with the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of
hˆ(AB) based on the observations hˆ(AE) and hˆ(EB) available to
Eve. From [7, eq. (45)] we obtain
gn = hˆ
(EB)
n Cn + hˆ
(AE)
n Dn, (14)
writing Cn and Dn as
Cn =
ρEBω
(EB)
n − ρABρAE
ω
(AE)
n ω
(EB)
n − ρ2AB
, (15a)
Dn =
ρAEω
(AE)
n − ρABρEB
ω
(AE)
n ω
(EB)
n − ρ2AB
, (15b)
where ω
(AE)
n = 1 +
σ2AE
λn
, ω
(EB)
n = 1 +
σ2EB
λn
and λn represents
the power delay. In the following we denote the choice (14)
as LLR attack for brevity.
B. Combined test
When the authentication metric is the sole LLR, Eve’s
forged signal can be optimized according to (14). If we change
the test used by Bob, we naturally improve the authentication
performance under the assumption that Eve’s is unaware of
Bob’s test. If instead Eve has perfect knowledge of Bob’s
acceptance strategy, then the same conclusion could no longer
hold true. In order to elaborate on this aspect, let us consider
an alternative decision strategy for Bob, based on a double
verification. Introducing a second decision metric besides the
LLR provides a more selective criterion for Bob to authenti-
cate Alice. As an example of second metric to be added to the
LLR, let us consider the modulus of the channel estimates.
The additional test based on the modulus is performed by
comparing the modulus of the reference estimate hˆ(AB), which
represents the only information available to Bob about the
main channel, and the current estimate hˆ. Thus we define
Γ =
N∑
n=1
(∣∣∣hˆ(AB)n ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣hˆn∣∣∣) . (16)
Using such a simple modulus comparison alone results in
a poor performance. However, we can use both the criterion
based on the LLR and that based on the modulus: only if both
these conditions are met, then Bob accepts the message. The
verification condition can be therefore written as{
Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ : decide for H0,
else : decide for H1,
(17)
where ǫ is a sufficiently small threshold. In the ideal case of
absence of noise in phase 1, ǫ should be equal to zero. Since
we are considering a realistic scenario affected by both noise
and fading, we must allow ǫ to be greater than zero in order
to allow Bob to accept messages coming from Alice.
The probability of false alarm can be therefore defined as
the probability that at least one of the two conditions is not
verified when the sender is Alice (hypothesis H0), i.e.
PFA = 1− P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H0] , (18)
while the probability of missed detection can be written as
PMD = P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H1] . (19)
Being Γ computed as the difference of the modulus of
two complex normal random variables, which follow Hoyt
distribution [15], its c.d.f. can be evaluated as in [16, eq. (8)].
However, a closed form expression for the joint probability
distribution of Ψ and Γ is not known, and for the probabilities
estimation we resort to Monte Carlo simulations.
1) Thresholds optimization: In order to find the optimal
values of the thresholds θ∗ and ǫ∗, we look for their joint
values which minimize the probability of MD, i.e.
(θ∗, ǫ∗) = argmin
θ,ǫ
P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H1] , (20)
under the constraint of a fixed PFA . We exploit an optimization
procedure based on dichotomic search, that computes the
couples (θ, ǫ) which satisfy the constraint imposed on the
PFA and then select the one that give the minimum PMD .
Since we do not have a closed form expression for the
probability of MD, we exploit an optimization procedure
based on dichotomic search, that computes the couples (θ, ǫ)
which satisfy the constraint imposed on the PFA and then
select the one that give the minimum PMD .
2) Attack strategy: Regarding the LLR plus modulus com-
parison criterion, finding an optimal attack requires further
considerations. We start looking for a possible attack for the
modulus comparison strategy, denoting it in the following as
modulus attack for brevity. For sake of simplicity, we suppose
that Eve can estimate the channel between Alice and herself,
but not the channel between her and Bob. Bob in fact receives
messages from Alice but is not expected to transmit enough
messages to allow the attacker to extract useful information
on h(EB). Moreover, we assume that Eve is able to perfectly
estimate h(AE) , i.e. σ2AE = 0.
In order to make |g| more similar to
∣∣∣hˆ(AB)∣∣∣ Eve can forge
gn =
hˆ(AE)
ρAE
, for ρAE 6= 0. (21)
When we consider a decision strategy based on both LLR
and modulus comparison, however, attacks based on (14)
and (21) are no longer optimal. In this case, the best attack
strategy, which we will denote as combined attack for brevity,
in fact consists in writing the vector g as
gn = ρ
x
AE hˆ
(AE)
n , (22)
where x ∈ [−1, 1]. This requires finding a trade-off between
the modulus attack and the LLR attack. In fact, x = −1
corresponds to the best attack to the modulus comparison
method, while x = 1 corresponds to the best attack strategy
to the LLR. Finding the optimal value of x corresponds to
solve the problem
x = arg max
x∈[−1,1]
P
[
Ψ(x) ≤ θ,Γ(x)2 ≤ ǫ2|g = ρxAEhˆ
(AE)
]
,
(23)
i.e. to find the value of x that gives the highest probability
of missed detection. In Tab. I we report the optimal values
of x obtained by solving (23) through numerical methods,
with PFA = 10
-4 and different values of sub-carriers N and
time correlation α. We observe that x depends on the value
of ρAE and that, in the case of a single sub-carrier, the LLR
attack represents the optimum solution for Eve even when
Bob adopts the combined test. However, since the attacker
does not know exactly the values of α, her most conservative
choice is to suppose that all the entries of α are equal to 1.
In fact, Eve is in the worst condition in absence of fading,
since Bob lets fewer messages to be accepted as authentic.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF OPTIMAL VALUES OF THE PARAMETER x FOR DIFFERENT
VALUES OF α, ρAE AND N .
α N
ρAE
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 0.7 1 0.8 1 0.9 0.9 1 1 1 1
0.9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0.8 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 1
6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 1
A comparative security assessment of the decision methods
discussed above is reported in Section V.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING-BASED DECISION TECHNIQUES
In this section we consider the use of machine learning
techniques in order to perform authentication according to
the protocol discussed in Section II. In particular, we consider
OCNN algorithms for the following reasons. In the training
phase, which corresponds to Phase I, Bob receives a limited
number of setup packets from Alice, while samples from
Eve are not available, thus making the choice of a binary
classification algorithm unsuitable for this setting. One-class
classification (OCC) instead proves to be more effective, since
the training set contains only samples from the target class (or
positive class), while for the other classes (or negative classes)
there are no instances (or they are very few or do not form
a statistically-representative sample of the negative concept)
[17]. The main purpose of OCC is to define decision limits
around the target class, in order to classify new instances
(new messages in our case) as internal or external. In the
case of a sample classified as external, this is not associated
to a specific class, but is just identified as not belonging
to the positive class (and therefore as a member of the
negative class). The goal of OCC is then more complex with
respect to traditional classification, with particular regard to
the definition of decision parameters and features to use in
order to better distinguish positive and negative instances.
Since in authentication schemes it is reasonable to assume
that Phase I is short and Bob receives a limited number of
setup packets, it is also fair to assume to work with a small
training set. Among classification algorithms (such as Sup-
port Vector Machines, Bayesian Networks, Neural Networks,
etc.), Nearest Neighbor (NN) methods are characterized by a
complexity which increases with the training set dimension,
being them instance-based: the training phase is based only
on the memorization of the training set, thus making their use
particularly suitable in the discussed scenario. Classification
of new instances happens by considering the labels of the
“nearest" samples of the training set, on the basis of specific
parameters [18]. They are also versatile to the implementation
of both binary and one-class classification, and OCNN tech-
niques can be easily derived from traditional NN algorithms.
In general, a OCNN algorithm works as follows [19]: it
finds the j nearest neighbors {y1, · · · , yj} of the test sample x
in the target class, and the k nearest neighbors {zi1, · · · , zik}
of the first j neighbors; it evaluates the average distance D¯xy
between
{
Dxy1, · · · , Dxyj
}
and the average distance D¯yz
between {Dy1z11 , · · · , Dy1z1k , · · · , Dy1zk1 , · · · , Dykzkk}; x
is then considered as a member of the target class if
D¯xy
D¯yz
< θd. (24)
OCNN methods can be categorized into four main categories
(11NN, 1KNN, J1NN, JKNN), depending on which of the
parameters j and k is fixed to 1. They differ in the number
of nearest neighbors used to compute the decision threshold.
Phase II of the protocol shown in Section II corresponds
to the actual classification. A new instance is recognized as
belonging to the positive class if its distance from the target
class is below a threshold θd, where d(·) represents a generic
distance between two instances. In formulas
f(x) = I (d(x) < θd) . (25)
I(·) represents an indicator function and f(x) is the binary
function expressing acceptance of the object x into the target
class (i.e. the training set X). This is not different from ver-
ification conditions (7) and (17), although here the presence
of the nearest neighbors is crucial for establishing the source
of the packet, while it is not considered in the analytical tests.
We consider the Euclidean distance as metric, defined as
d
(
hˆ(AB) , hˆ
)
=
√√√√ 2N∑
i=1
(
ai(hˆ(AB))− ai(hˆ)
)2
, (26)
where {a1(x), · · · , a2N(x)} is the feature vector collecting
the attributes of a generic instance x. In our case attributes are
represented by the real and imaginary parts of the estimates
hˆ(AB) and hˆmeasured on each sub-carrier. Parameters j, k and
θd are optimized using a g-fold cross-validation [20]. Optimal
attack strategy still consists of the ML estimate of Alice-Bob
channel. Differently from the statistical methods examined,
OCNN techniques have the advantage of not requiring the
knowledge of any CSI by the authenticator.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we assess and compare the performance
of statistical and machine learning-based decision methods
under different system conditions and assumptions. For the
sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we consider
examples in which time-varying fading affects all channels in
the same way, i.e. αn = α for n = 1, · · · , N . The average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on channel estimates during both
phases has been calculated as a function of the noise variance
as SNR(I) = 1/σ2I and SNR
(II) = 1/σ2II .
We first measure the security achieved by the statistical
decision criteria presented in Section III in terms of average
probability of MD. The probability of FA has been fixed
equal to 10-4 for both the examined methods and the spatial
correlation ρAE has been set equal to 0.1, with the meaning
of Eve very far from Bob’s position. From the results in Fig.
2 it is evident how much the channel variability (represented
by decreasing values of α) degrades the performance of the
system, with a significant increase in the probability of MD
with respect to the flat fading case (i.e., α = 1). Looking at
the figure, we note that, with respect to the sole LLR test,
the combined test helps Bob to enhance the performance of
the scheme, and this becomes more and more evident for
increasing numbers of sub-carriers.
1 2 3 4 5 6
N
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
E[
P M
D
]
LLR test
Combined test
 = 1
 = 0.9
 = 0.8
Fig. 2. Average MD probability E[PMD ] versus number of sub-carriers N ,
comparing three different test methods, for different values of α, ρAE = 0.1,
with SNR(I) = 15dB and SNR(II) →∞.
For OCNN techniques, we consider a training set of 103
samples and a data set of dimension 106. In general none of
the examined classifiers proves to achieve better performance
than the others, although JKNN requires a higher computa-
tional cost. In Tables II and III we show the performance
achieved by OCNN algorithms in comparison with the results
obtained by applying the statistical methods to the same data
set (we report the results obtained only by the classifier which
results the best among the others in the considered cases)
for two different values of the spatial correlation parameter
ρAE . With ρAE = 0.1, we observe that OCNN algorithms
achieve excellent performance in a flat fading scenario, with
probabilities of FA and MD less than 10−6, while when we
consider more varying channels they tend to exhibit a higher
probability of FA.1 This behavior is more evident when Eve
1Probability < 10−6 means that no error has been found over the entire
data set. In order to perform an analytical evaluation, these values have been
considered equal to 10−6.
is closer to Bob, i.e. when the value of ρAE is higher. From
Tab. III we observe that, while the probability of FA increases
with the decreasing of α (and with the number of sub-carriers
N ), the probability of MD obtained by the classifier does not
change with the time-varying fading. This happens because,
according to Phase I, the training set corresponds only to the
initial state of the channel, thus remaining the same despite
the time variability of the channel (in fact Bob is not aware of
the value of α during the collection of the reference strings).
However, although statistical methods consider the role of the
time-varying fading for the decision by means of the variance
σ2, which contains the time correlation parameter α, OCNN
techniques result to be the best choice for low values of the
spatial correlation. We observe that the combined statistical
test we have considered in our examples is efficient when
Eve’s and Bob’s channels have low correlation, while the
classic LLR test alone may be the best solution in the case
of highly correlated channels of Eve and Bob.
TABLE II
AVERAGE MD AND FA PROBABILITIES OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT TEST
METHODS, FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α, WITH ρAE = 0.1,
SNR(I) = 15DB AND SNR(II) = 20DB.
α N 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
PFA 0.001 < 10
-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (1KNN) < 10
-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.240 0.146 0.044 0.012 0.0029 6.9 · 10
-4
PMD (comb) 0.239 0.132 0.036 0.010 0.0019 5.5 · 10
-4
0.9
PFA 0.136 0.374 0.257 0.435 0.425 0.713
PMD (1KNN) < 10
-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.320 0.064 0.040 0.0079 0.0034 3 · 10
-4
PMD (comb) 0.315 0.027 0.0096 0.0019 0.005 < 10
-6
0.8
PFA 0.358 0.668 0.602 0.812 0.848 0.964
PMD (1KNN) < 10
-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.268 0.050 0.033 0.005 0.0018 1.1 · 10
-4
PMD (comb) 0.228 0.011 0.0027 3.9 · 10
-5 7 · 10-6 < 10-6
TABLE III
AVERAGE MD AND FA PROBABILITIES OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT TEST
METHODS, FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α, WITH ρAE = 0.8,
SNR(I) = 15DB AND SNR(II) = 20DB.
α N 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
PFA 0.010 1.6 · 10
-4 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (1KNN) 0.206 0.110 0.041 0.018 0.012 0.005
PMD (LLR) 0.392 0.326 0.319 0.183 0.099 0.052
PMD (comb) 0.391 0.331 0.279 0.171 0.078 0.027
0.9
PFA 0.540 0.799 0.863 0.877 0.817 0.865
PMD (1KNN) 0.206 0.110 0.041 0.018 0.012 0.005
PMD (LLR) 0.221 0.045 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.003
PMD (comb) 0.353 0.127 0.060 0.032 0.035 0.021
0.8
PFA 0.739 0.928 0.970 0.983 0.982 0.991
PMD (1KNN) 0.206 0.110 0.041 0.018 0.012 0.005
PMD (LLR) 0.160 0.027 0.007 0.003 0.002 6.1 · 10
-4
PMD (comb) 0.258 0.067 0.029 0.021 0.017 9.7 · 10
-4
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of physical layer au-
thentication based on channel estimates in the case of time-
varying fading channels. In order to overcome the loss in
terms of security coming from this phenomenon, we have
proposed different decision methods for an authenticator to
establish who is the source of the message and detect forged
channel estimates. These methods are based on statistical
criteria and OCC techniques. We have shown that, although
the training phase ignores the presence of the fading, OCNN
algorithms prove to offer better security performance in most
of the examined cases, while statistical methods maintain
some advantage when a strong spatial correlation between the
attacker and the authenticator exists.
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